Bongjoo Kim, Chhandosi Roy, and Mehwish Sarwari. "Regime Type of Foreign Supporters of Resistance Movements and its Impact on State Repression" Terrorism and Political Violence. (Published)
Does the regime type of a foreign state supporter of a resistance movement influence violent repression by domestic states facing resistance? Studies on resistance movements have recently begun to explore the effects of third-party support on the behaviors and successes of the movements themselves and the governments they oppose (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021). While this literature has unearthed important findings on the impact of external interventions on behalf of resistance groups, one area of research that remains unexplored is how the political features of third-party actors shape the behavior of governments that face resistance movements. This study investigates how the domestic political characteristics of foreign supporters of resistance movements affect the repressive behaviors of domestic states facing resistance. Looking specifically at the regime type of foreign state supporters of opposition groups, we argue that resistance movements that receive assistance from democratic foreign states deter domestic governments facing resistance from using violent repression. Such governments recognize the selection effects associated with democratic intervention and the reputational costs associated with human rights practices and thus, they are less likely to commit physical violence against dissidents. Our findings for resistance campaigns during the period of 1981-2013 support our expectations that external support from democratic states for resistance movements reduces the likelihood of domestic governments facing resistance using violent repression against dissident groups.
Key words: Resistance campaigns; Violent state repression; External support; Domestic politics; Regime type
Does the regime type of a foreign state supporter of a resistance movement influence violent repression by domestic states facing resistance? Studies on resistance movements have recently begun to explore the effects of third-party support on the behaviors and successes of the movements themselves and the governments they oppose (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021). While this literature has unearthed important findings on the impact of external interventions on behalf of resistance groups, one area of research that remains unexplored is how the political features of third-party actors shape the behavior of governments that face resistance movements. This study investigates how the domestic political characteristics of foreign supporters of resistance movements affect the repressive behaviors of domestic states facing resistance. Looking specifically at the regime type of foreign state supporters of opposition groups, we argue that resistance movements that receive assistance from democratic foreign states deter domestic governments facing resistance from using violent repression. Such governments recognize the selection effects associated with democratic intervention and the reputational costs associated with human rights practices and thus, they are less likely to commit physical violence against dissidents. Our findings for resistance campaigns during the period of 1981-2013 support our expectations that external support from democratic states for resistance movements reduces the likelihood of domestic governments facing resistance using violent repression against dissident groups.
Key words: Resistance campaigns; Violent state repression; External support; Domestic politics; Regime type
"Rich Rebel, Poor Peacekeeping: UN Peacekeeping Operations Mitigating Civilian Killings in Rich-Resource Conflict-Affected Countries" (in preparation for submission)
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKOs) are widely regarded as effective in mitigating civilian victimization. However, this paper argues that their effectiveness diminishes in conflict-affected countries with abundant lootable natural resources. In resource-rich environments, where opportunistic rebel groups prioritize economic gains over political objectives, traditional peacekeeping mechanisms—creating buffer zones, reducing information problems, and mitigating commitment issues—become less effective. By physically separating warring factions, peacekeepers inadvertently shield rebels from government forces, increasing their reliance on civilian targeting. Troops, the most heavily deployed personnel, struggle to prevent violence, while police face challenges due to weak governance and poor rule of law. Military observers, often deployed in minimal numbers, lack deterrence capacity, further limiting their impact. Empirical analysis using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model shows that UN PKOs have differing effects on civilian victimization depending on the presence of lootable natural resources. While PKOs, particularly those involving troops and police, reduce one-sided violence in resource-poor conflicts, their deployment in resource-rich settings is associated with increased civilian targeting. This study contributes to the growing literature on peacekeeping effectiveness by highlighting the critical role of natural resources in shaping conflict dynamics and the limitations of UN PKOs in mitigating violence in these contexts.
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKOs) are widely regarded as effective in mitigating civilian victimization. However, this paper argues that their effectiveness diminishes in conflict-affected countries with abundant lootable natural resources. In resource-rich environments, where opportunistic rebel groups prioritize economic gains over political objectives, traditional peacekeeping mechanisms—creating buffer zones, reducing information problems, and mitigating commitment issues—become less effective. By physically separating warring factions, peacekeepers inadvertently shield rebels from government forces, increasing their reliance on civilian targeting. Troops, the most heavily deployed personnel, struggle to prevent violence, while police face challenges due to weak governance and poor rule of law. Military observers, often deployed in minimal numbers, lack deterrence capacity, further limiting their impact. Empirical analysis using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model shows that UN PKOs have differing effects on civilian victimization depending on the presence of lootable natural resources. While PKOs, particularly those involving troops and police, reduce one-sided violence in resource-poor conflicts, their deployment in resource-rich settings is associated with increased civilian targeting. This study contributes to the growing literature on peacekeeping effectiveness by highlighting the critical role of natural resources in shaping conflict dynamics and the limitations of UN PKOs in mitigating violence in these contexts.
"Public Attitudes of UN Peacekeeping Operations in Conflict-Affected Countries” (with Jiseon Chang)
(Work in progress)
This paper examines the growing resistance to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) in host countries, with a focus on the recent decline in public support in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The UN Security Council’s decision to withdraw MONUSCO in 2023 underscores the importance of understanding public opinion on peacekeeping missions. While prior research has analyzed factors affecting PKO success, such as civilian protection and mission duration, the role of host-state and public support remains underexplored. Recent studies have begun addressing public perceptions of PKOs, yet the underlying reasons for support or opposition remain ambiguous, affecting mission effectiveness and withdrawal decisions. This study proposes to conduct original survey experiments in the DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR), both of which have experience with UN PKOs, as well as in Nigeria, which has no direct exposure to UN PKOs, to investigate how public attitudes toward peacekeeping operations are shaped. We hypothesize that performance legitimacy has a stronger positive impact on public perception than normative legitimacy and that considering the local context also relates to positive perceptions towards PKOs.
(Work in progress)
This paper examines the growing resistance to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) in host countries, with a focus on the recent decline in public support in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The UN Security Council’s decision to withdraw MONUSCO in 2023 underscores the importance of understanding public opinion on peacekeeping missions. While prior research has analyzed factors affecting PKO success, such as civilian protection and mission duration, the role of host-state and public support remains underexplored. Recent studies have begun addressing public perceptions of PKOs, yet the underlying reasons for support or opposition remain ambiguous, affecting mission effectiveness and withdrawal decisions. This study proposes to conduct original survey experiments in the DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR), both of which have experience with UN PKOs, as well as in Nigeria, which has no direct exposure to UN PKOs, to investigate how public attitudes toward peacekeeping operations are shaped. We hypothesize that performance legitimacy has a stronger positive impact on public perception than normative legitimacy and that considering the local context also relates to positive perceptions towards PKOs.
"Punishing Time: Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and United Nations Peacekeeping Deployment”
(with Hoshik Nam) (in preparation for submission)
How does the states’ reputation of human rights violation affect the attention of the United Nations toward them? Since the deployment of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) in 1956 and the first large scale mission of the UN Operation in Congo (ONUC) in 1960, the focus on identifying and analyzing the pattern of the United Nations peacekeeping operations deployment has continued in both policy and academic communities. More recent studies have found that the enforcement operations are motivated by either humanitarian sentiment or national interests. (Jakobsen 1996) Regarding humanitarian sentiment, high level of war casualty (Gilligan and Stedman 2003), higher conflict challenge due to weaker government (Fortna 2008), and greater risk of genocide (Melander 2009) positively correlate with higher probability of the UN deployment. The national interests can be seen in the pattern where the West gets more of the UN's attention than Asia (Gilligan and Stedman 2003), and also in the case where recipients have the previous involvement by the UN or other regional organizations positively correlated with higher probability of the country receiving peacekeeping operations. (Mullenbach 2005) However, we argue that recipients’ reputation of human rights violations has a negative causal effect on the probability of them receiving UN peacekeeping deployment. Given that United Nations blue helmets are specifically focused on mitigating human rights violations, we expect the UPR will draw the UN’s significant attention since the process of “naming and shaming” significantly harms the reputations of the states being named.
(with Hoshik Nam) (in preparation for submission)
How does the states’ reputation of human rights violation affect the attention of the United Nations toward them? Since the deployment of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) in 1956 and the first large scale mission of the UN Operation in Congo (ONUC) in 1960, the focus on identifying and analyzing the pattern of the United Nations peacekeeping operations deployment has continued in both policy and academic communities. More recent studies have found that the enforcement operations are motivated by either humanitarian sentiment or national interests. (Jakobsen 1996) Regarding humanitarian sentiment, high level of war casualty (Gilligan and Stedman 2003), higher conflict challenge due to weaker government (Fortna 2008), and greater risk of genocide (Melander 2009) positively correlate with higher probability of the UN deployment. The national interests can be seen in the pattern where the West gets more of the UN's attention than Asia (Gilligan and Stedman 2003), and also in the case where recipients have the previous involvement by the UN or other regional organizations positively correlated with higher probability of the country receiving peacekeeping operations. (Mullenbach 2005) However, we argue that recipients’ reputation of human rights violations has a negative causal effect on the probability of them receiving UN peacekeeping deployment. Given that United Nations blue helmets are specifically focused on mitigating human rights violations, we expect the UPR will draw the UN’s significant attention since the process of “naming and shaming” significantly harms the reputations of the states being named.
"UN Peacekeeping, Refugees, and Sexual Violence in Civil Wars” (with Michelle Benson, Kristen Cruz)
(Work in progress)
Since the adoption of UNSCR 1325, the prevention and mitigation of sexual violence in civil war has become one of the abiding tenets of modern peacekeeping (Benson and Gizelis 2020). Recent studies have found, encouragingly, that UN peacekeeping is associated with a reduction the prevalence of sexual violence (Kirschner and Miller 2019). The mechanisms for this effect have focused largely on operational robustness or on the specific deployment of types of peacekeepers. This paper, focuses instead on how UN peacekeeping might further reduce the prevalence of sexual violence through the moderated effect of protecting and reducing refugee populations. Given that the high levels of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are related to higher levels of sexual violence (Vu et al. 2014), we expect that the presence of robust UNKPO’s (Kathman 2013) interacted with a higher UN commitment to refugees (per capita) (UNHCR 2020) should be associated with lower levels of sexual violence in conflict (Cohen and Nordas 2014). This relationship should be further strengthened in the presence of PKOs with specific mandates for the protection of women/children and civilians in armed conflict (Benson and Tucker 2020).
(Work in progress)
Since the adoption of UNSCR 1325, the prevention and mitigation of sexual violence in civil war has become one of the abiding tenets of modern peacekeeping (Benson and Gizelis 2020). Recent studies have found, encouragingly, that UN peacekeeping is associated with a reduction the prevalence of sexual violence (Kirschner and Miller 2019). The mechanisms for this effect have focused largely on operational robustness or on the specific deployment of types of peacekeepers. This paper, focuses instead on how UN peacekeeping might further reduce the prevalence of sexual violence through the moderated effect of protecting and reducing refugee populations. Given that the high levels of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are related to higher levels of sexual violence (Vu et al. 2014), we expect that the presence of robust UNKPO’s (Kathman 2013) interacted with a higher UN commitment to refugees (per capita) (UNHCR 2020) should be associated with lower levels of sexual violence in conflict (Cohen and Nordas 2014). This relationship should be further strengthened in the presence of PKOs with specific mandates for the protection of women/children and civilians in armed conflict (Benson and Tucker 2020).
"Confidence in the UN: Government Ideology, Ideological Disposition, and Public Opinion in South Korea and the United States" (with Jiseon Chang and Ikhee Cho) (Under review)
How do individual ideological orientations and government ideology shape public confidence in international organizations (IOs), and how do these dynamics differ between the United States (US) and South Korea? This paper examines the determinants of citizens’ confidence in IOs, with a focus on the United Nations (UN), emphasizing the role of ideological disposition and government ideology. Using the World Values Survey (WVS), we find that in the US, individuals express higher confidence in the UN under liberal governments, whereas in South Korea, confidence in the UN is higher under conservative governments. We argue that government ideology shapes confidence in IOs differently across the two countries, as citizens perceive international organizations through their domestic political lens. Furthermore, this paper finds that an individual’s ideological orientation has a divergent impact on confidence in the UN. Particularly, left-leaning individuals in the US have higher confidence, while individual ideological orientation is not statistically significant in South Korea. Overall, this paper contends that citizens’ perceptions of the UN are influenced not only by their personal ideological leanings but also by their government’s ideology.
How do individual ideological orientations and government ideology shape public confidence in international organizations (IOs), and how do these dynamics differ between the United States (US) and South Korea? This paper examines the determinants of citizens’ confidence in IOs, with a focus on the United Nations (UN), emphasizing the role of ideological disposition and government ideology. Using the World Values Survey (WVS), we find that in the US, individuals express higher confidence in the UN under liberal governments, whereas in South Korea, confidence in the UN is higher under conservative governments. We argue that government ideology shapes confidence in IOs differently across the two countries, as citizens perceive international organizations through their domestic political lens. Furthermore, this paper finds that an individual’s ideological orientation has a divergent impact on confidence in the UN. Particularly, left-leaning individuals in the US have higher confidence, while individual ideological orientation is not statistically significant in South Korea. Overall, this paper contends that citizens’ perceptions of the UN are influenced not only by their personal ideological leanings but also by their government’s ideology.
